Abstract Neuroeconomics draws attention to motive forces that are ignored in the standard framework of economic theory. The present paper develops a conceptual approach that, similar to Pennings et al. (Journal of Bioeconomics 7: 113-127, 2005), tackles the issues at the systemic level by analyzing and modeling the brain processes that decide on behavior. It takes as the basic unit of analysis potential stimulus-response actions which-when selected-become actual behavior. The objective of these potential stimulus-response actions is to increase utility. At any moment of time, several of these potential actions compete with each other for the privilege of becoming actual behavior. This competition can be modeled on the basis of economic principles. The behavior that materializes may cover the range from the rational to the foolish, depending on which of the potential responses gathers the greatest emotional strength. The emotional strength of a potential response, in turn, is determined by the individual's past experience and her capacity for rational action. Given that the objective is always to increase utility, it can normally be expected that the more or less rational dominates the foolish, but this need not always be the case. Which potential actions become behavior in a concrete instance is decided by a mechanism implemented by the basal ganglia, a structure in the brain serving as the action selection mechanism. The insights provided by this approach afford coherent explanations of behaviors that are not readily explicable by the standard approach of economic theory.
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Introduction
The new field of neuroeconomics has the potential of subserving all the various styles of economic analysis, despite the reviews of Camerer et al. (2005) and Zak (2004) that see it primarily in support of the behavioral and evolutionary camps. Leading figures of new institutional economics such as North (1994) , Williamson (2000) and Coase (1978) 1 also look to the cognitive sciences to throw more light on the foundations of people's economic behavior, and a neoclassical economist like McFadden (1999) recognizes that there are new (neuroscientific) measurements that challenge his preferred model. More positively, neuroeconomics may be able to inform about the extent of consistency of the usual rationality assumptions with people's cognitive processes. There is thus the potential that this new branch helps to bridge the gaps between these different schools of economic thought.
The present paper hopes to contribute to this development by drawing together insights from the cognitive sciences that focus on the underlying springs of behavior and by giving these insights an economic interpretation. The starting point is that brain processes consist of exchanges between billions of neurons that can also be thought of as constituting an economic system, where this system obeys laws of scarcity and value and behaves according to and cost-benefit relations. If this is so, there should be discernable in the brain a structure by which these economic processes are governed. There does, indeed, exist such a structure functioning in terms of demand for and supply of behavior, different technologies with which to realize this behavior, competition, and a mechanism reminiscent of an auctioneer that determines what actual behavior will occur. 2 The contribution is seen to be two-fold. On the one hand, the proposed approach may help to explain activities in the brain by applying economic methodology. On the other hand, it may contribute to a better understanding of people's actual economic behavior. From the first perspective, the individual as a unique 'single-minded' entity dissolves, and behavior materializes at each moment of time as the sum of the outcomes of neural processes without any necessary reference to such an entity; from the second perspective, the individual as the acting entity is again assumed whose behavior however can be explained in terms of these processes. The analysis will be mostly from the first perspective, but there will be a shift to the second point of view toward the end of the paper. 3 1 Coase refers here to socio-biology, not neuroscience.
2 An anonymous referee recommended that the sense in which these economic terms are used in the paper be clarified from the outset. The term 'demand' is used here more in the sense of operations research as 'demand placed on a system' to fulfill a particular task by one of several available means, and the term 'supply' is defined as the ability of the system to provide several such means. The other terms have their usual meanings. 3 The question how the individual as the acting entity-supposedly with all the attributes of an independent self-emerges out of the sum results of brain processes, as described in the text, is a hotly debated question in philosophy of mind. For the interested reader, Libet et al. (1999) is a good start. For an economist it is safest to evade the question and simply assume that it makes sense to argue at these two levels of analysis.
